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Abstract
By focusing on the case of the Italian political movement “Five Stars”, founded in 2009 
by former comedian Beppe Grillo, this article will analyze the resurfacing of a particular 
kind of power – charismatic authority – through a platform such as Web 2.0 that was 
expected to promote more rational consensus strategies. Although the political action 
of the Five Stars movement pretends to be inspired by a participative culture, it is in 
fact directly ruled by the founder via his blog, with a little space allowed for discussions. 
In this sense, the rise of Grillo as a political leader seems to both retrieve and renew 
an old form of authority grounded in a very traditional legitimacy – the charismatic and 
undisputed leadership of the boss – while at the same time being able to spread through 
the network. This article will offer an overview of events and also provide a theoretical 
interpretation.
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Introduction
Insofar as networks are decentralized and almost freely accessible, they are intended to 
be more democratic than the older media: to a great extent, this is the current idea of the 
web as a political tool. In actuality many experiences in which the web has been exploited, 
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and even stressed to its limits, for radically democratic purposes easily come to mind – 
the Seattle movement, the German Pirate Party, Occupy the World, to name just a few. 
Even though blogs and social media are expected to play a role in the widening of demo-
cratic debate, my discussion will focus on the Italian movement “Five Stars”, founded by 
Beppe Grillo in 2009, which has revealed a very different pattern. Although the party has 
acted exclusively via the web, with no traditional structure and very rare physical meet-
ings (indeed, Grillo has always refused to define it as a “party”), there is no democracy 
inside the movement. Decision-making, far from being decentralized, is totally embed-
ded in the figure of its leader. Nonetheless, since its birth the movement has been exploit-
ing the democratic rhetoric of the web as a topical argument as well as a critique to 
traditional hierarchies, and has been growing in popularity and consensus. My concern 
therefore is not only for the political consequences directly brought about by the move-
ment, but also for the extent to which digital environments, in a broader sense, are 
exposed to the rise of populist leaderships.
The rise of the movement, 2007–2013
Already a well-known comedian when he decided to enter the political arena and founded 
his own movement, Beppe Grillo was a famous protagonist in 1980s Italian mainstream 
entertainment. In 1986, during a popular prime-time TV show, he accused the Italian 
Socialist Party of being responsible for the widespread corruption of political and eco-
nomic affairs. As a consequence, the Italian public TV company RAI, controlled by the 
most influential parties, immediately decided to ban him. This episode marked a turning 
point in his career, consecrating him as a subversive and anti-establishment figure, a 
reputation he would largely exploit in his subsequent political adventure.
The first step in Grillo’s political rise was the birth of his blog. Launched in 2005 and 
mainly dedicated to environmental topics and corruption issues, it was destined to be an 
unpredictable success. If we look at the Observer’s list of the 50 most powerful blogs in 
the world, beppegrillo.it ranks number 9, while the author himself ranks number 7 in the 
Forbes list of the most influential web celebrities. According to the Guardian, he is even 
supposed to be one of the most influential bloggers worldwide, while Technorati ranks 
his blog among the 10 most popular in the world. The collected data are even more 
impressive when we consider that the blog is dedicated to Italian local issues, and its 
main language is almost unknown outside Italy.
As for the political project, Five Stars’ program has been established by the leader 
himself – rather than through public consultation via social media, as in properly net-
worked movements – and is organized into seven main fields: relationship between state 
and citizens; energy; information; economy; transport; health; and education. However, 
this program is far from being clear and, in this sense, is similar to that of many European 
populist parties. What bloggers need – Mathieu O’Neil (2009: 117) points out – are basi-
cally enemies, for “without them, they would have nothing to write about”. Indeed, since 
the birth of the movement, Grillo has been looking for exactly that, mostly focusing on 
the exploitation of complaints about corruption and politician privileges. Occasionally 
he has included other issues related to immigration regulation, resistance to global finan-
cial powers, opposition to European currency, contrast to petty crime, development of 
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local autonomies, and so forth. One can say that there is nothing new in this situation, 
inasmuch as economic crisis often gives rise to demagogic reactions. New elements 
however emerge if we consider the technological conditions upon which the movement 
has developed and this paradoxical overlapping of new digital environments and old 
ideological temptations.
As for Grillo’s political action, three events are worth mentioning: the so-called 
“V-Day” in 2007; the local elections in 2012; and the national political elections in 2013. 
The V-Day was the first political demonstration organized by Grillo in the Italian squares: 
the “V” formed with fingers representing an Italian curse word, and also referring to 
Alan Moore and David Lloyd’s V for Vendetta and its call for popular revenge against 
government abuses of power. In 2007, Grillo collected more than 300,000 signatures for 
a law that would prevent corrupt politicians from being eligible for election; a notable 
result, considering that under Italian legislation popular initiative laws only require 
50,000 signatures. Nevertheless, the Italian Parliament oddly refused to take the proposal 
into account, in so doing deepening the rift between the people and the “Palace” (to say 
it in the words of Pier Paolo Pasolini), which gave new strength to the most pivotal sub-
ject in Grillo’s propaganda.
As a consequence, Five Stars’ popularity continued to grow, leading it to notable suc-
cess at local government elections. The most relevant result was achieved in 2012 in 
Parma, a wealthy city in the north of Italy, where the previous City Council had been 
tainted by many corruption allegations and scandals. Here, the majority of people even-
tually voted for Five Stars’ candidate Gabriele Pizzarotti, who was elected as mayor. At 
that time, 38-year-old Pizzarotti was very young with in Italian terms, totally unknown 
in public opinion and with no political experience. This was to become the Grillo, and 
Five Stars, method: candidates are actually requested to not have any political experi-
ence, and are recruited from the so-called “civil society”. People willing to enter politics 
simply have to submit their curriculum vitae to Grillo’s blog and let the leader evaluate 
them and make the final decision – apparently following his personal preferences, with 
no transparency whatsoever.
The final chapter of the story was written on the occasion of the 2013 general elec-
tions. Five Stars actually obtained more than 7.2 million votes in the Senate (23.79%), 
and more than 8.7 million votes in the Chamber of Deputies (25.11%), becoming the 
party with the second highest number of votes, or even the party with the most votes if 
we do not count those of Italians abroad. These results are more impressive when we 
consider that Five Stars conducted a low-cost electoral campaign, arguably mobilizing 
people through word-of-mouth communication, without using any state funding, and, if 
anything, taking advantage of the excessive cost of politics as a main argument against 
the other parties.
Even though Grillo’s blog is the actual house organ of the party, I am not pretending 
that it can exhaust the reasons for his political success. On the contrary, many other fac-
tors should be considered – not only Five Stars’ specific proposal, but the fact of its 
leader’s popularity due to not being part of the old political class. Perhaps the widely 
believed inefficacy of Parliament played a role, eventually generating the need to find an 
alternative to traditional parties. As far as I am concerned, though, I will only address the 
role of Grillo’s blog with respect to both Italian society and cyberspace, in order to raise 
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some broader questions about the influence of digital platforms and the unpredictability 
of their links with the evolution of the public sphere.
In only a few years Five Stars has moved from the limited ambition of a blog to 
becoming a real protagonist in Italian history, so that its success is now posing some 
undeniable problems. To what extent can we think of Grillo as a party leader, considering 
that he has not been elected by anyone? How can a party contribute to democratic debate, 
without any internal democracy? As for Grillo, is his role supposed to expire, and if so 
when? Will it be reconsidered and submitted to any form of evaluation, or should we 
consider him as a leader for life?
In the end, his television experience accounted for his popularity as a comedian, but 
the web gave rise to his credibility as a politician. Therefore the question here is: how 
could this leadership – apparently typical of televised propaganda – take place in the new 
digital environment? In order to answer this question, we should take into account two 
different factors: structural and local. The first basically refers to the technical advan-
tages of the web and its tendency towards concentration (which is likely to assume a 
charismatic nature in the case of blogs), while the second has to do with recent Italian 
history, and its political events and cultural peculiarities.
Literature review: From the power of the web to the 
power in the web
It is not easy to fully understand the political implications of the web, because internet-
driven communication is causing very different aftermaths: hugely democratic uses of 
the new devices, as in the case of Occupy Wall Street or Indignados; advanced applica-
tions of viral marketing principles, as in the famous 2008 Obama campaign; and even 
populist waves in other countries such as Venezuela or the Philippines. In order to under-
stand why Italian politics has been affected by the latter tendency, we have to take into 
account both structural and local levels.
As for the structural level, one of the limits of web theory could be to consider that 
exclusion is the only form of discrimination, the clearest example of this being the digital 
divide of connected and non-connected people. In this way, little attention has been paid 
to several forms of discrimination and inequality taking place inside the network, despite 
the relatively early discovery of the “power-law” as the main rule in web development.
Empirical evidence actually shows that there are several good reasons to question the 
widely accepted idea of the web as a fully “decentralized” structure. The rise of merito-
cratic leadership inside the open source environments, or the dictatorship of a few active 
users in Wikipedia’s and many other communities reveals a very different pattern, which 
must be considered as a “centralization” movement. Ultimately this tendency probably 
has to do with the power-law structure of the web, first discovered by the Faloutsos broth-
ers and clearly illustrated by Albert-Lázsló Barabási. According to Barabási (2002: 70),
unevenness characterizes networks […]. Power laws mathematically formulate the fact that in 
most real networks the majority of nodes have only a few links and that these numerous tiny 
nodes coexist with a few big hubs, nodes with an anomalously high number of links.
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The same tendency therefore affects different levels of the digital environment, from 
the network’s basic technical pattern of linking to the consistent imbalance between the 
centrality of different sites, which is usually referred to as the “topology” of the web. An 
important question we might ask is: to what extent is this centralization also affecting the 
relationship between users? As for the political use of the web, Sandra González-Bailón 
(2013: 2–4) argues, we might “debunk claims that equate online networks to horizontal 
structures”: rather, the way the web can “help people self-organize” has to do with the 
embedding of traditional practices, namely opinion leadership and two-step flow of com-
munication. In other words, the affordability of the web for political engagement is a 
measure of its ability to exploit pre-existing phenomena such as ideological polarization, 
opinion-giving strategies, and spreading cascades: a property that Grillo would be able 
to stress to its limit.
At a basic level, generally speaking, the structural imbalance of the web has been 
repeatedly demonstrated through the statistical distribution of incoming and outgoing 
links, intended as the vital resource for any website, with both following the power-law 
rule. Faloutsos et al. (1999) studied a sample of more than 11,000 nodes, and concluded 
that the power-law fits the data “very well, resulting in correlation coefficients of 96% or 
higher”. Albert-Lázsló Barabási and his team obtained a confirmation of the previous 
result by detecting the power-law organization of the in-links of the 325,000 pages on the 
University of Notre Dame’s domain (Barabási and Albert, 1999). Andrei Broder studied 
a more significant sample of 203 million pages, and found a clear separation between a 
few highly connected sites – the core – and the vast majority of nodes, which become 
progressively less connected or literally disconnected from the system (Broder et al., 
2004). Zoltan Dezsö analyzed the topology of the Hungarian news portal Horigo, clearly 
divided into a “stable skeleton” and a large number of “documents only temporally 
linked” to the structure, in so doing confirming the validity of the same rule, also referred 
to as “Pareto’s principle” (Dezsö et al., 2006). Adamic and Huberman (1999) found a 
similar power-law pattern by studying a 700,000-node sample and taking into account 
the distribution of subpages between the different sites, which was supposed to be a 
direct indication of their strength, and showing a clear opposition between a strict minor-
ity of rich nodes and a vast majority of one- or few-page sites. According to Pennock 
et al. (2002), the power-law plays a fundamental role in the political economy of the web, 
even though some types of websites can diverge from the main rule, “with the magnitude 
of deviation varying from category to category”.
Not only is the power-law the basic rule in web development – for which internet traf-
fic and the in-link distribution cluster around a small number of hubs – but a similar 
concentration tendency is likely to affect the relationship between end users as well 
(Barabási and Albert, 1999: 512). In studying the relationships that people develop via 
email, Ebel et al. (2002: 4) found the presence of a few powerful subjects, characterized 
by a very intense frequency of exchanges, regulating the communication flow at large. 
Additionally, Lada Adamic discovered that the exchanges in peer-to-peer networks and 
file-sharing sites, such as Gnutella and Freenet, are ruled by the disproportion between a 
majority of weak nodes and a few influential, highly connected users. Here the power-
law reflects not only a statistical imbalance but also “the presence of central individuals 
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who interact with many others on a daily basis” and “play a key role in relaying informa-
tion” (Adamic et al., 2001: 1).
A number of surveys focusing on Twitter – one of the supposed protagonists of 
democratic uprisings in both North Africa and the Western world – have demonstrated 
its actual dependence upon the same power-law tendency. According to the survey 
conducted by Wu and others on a sample of more than 250 million tweets, 0.05% of 
users account for over 50% of all messages (Wu et al., 2011: 5). As for the practice of 
information retweeting, which can be considered as a likely indicator of the impor-
tance of different users, the studies measured a similar distribution, clearly regulated 
by power-law (Bakshy et al., 2011: 4; Cha et al., 2010: 4). Although these findings 
may not be surprising, it is unexpected to observe a similar tendency in the well-
known case of the Arab Spring. Studying a dataset made of 600,000 tweets with 
hashtag “#25 jan”, used during the 2011 Egyptian revolution, Wilson and Dunn (2011: 
18) found a “clear manifestation of a power law rule”, for which “a small minority of 
a large group” was responsible for a highly “intensive contribution”, thereby showing 
that a kind of leadership – technical, if not political – is likely to emerge within the 
new movements.
In examining Wikipedia – probably the most successful case of cooperation in web 
history – things seem to work no differently. For instance, out of 29,000 users examined 
in a survey, only 143 were administrators, and no more than seven of them had true 
decision-making autonomy (Ciffolilli, 2003). According to another survey, Wikipedia 
authors fall under the authority of a handful of arbitrators who, while accounting for a 
very small minority of the community, are nonetheless able to put the others “out of the 
game” (Bryant et al., 2005: 9). Christian Fuchs referred to this structure as a “pyramid”, 
where common users stay at the bottom, while above them, in ascending order, are “reg-
istered users, ambassadors, mediators, administrators, arbitrators, developers and bureau-
crats”. Only the last four are vested with an actual authority (Fuchs, 2008: 319).
A clear concentration in decision-making processes has been observed within open 
source communities as well. Despite the radically democratic ideology of the open 
source world, Mockus et al. (2000) found that 0.03% of Apache community members are 
responsible for 90% of interventions. In a 2002 survey, they found out that almost 50% 
of technical problems within the Mozilla community are resolved by an incredibly small 
minority (Mockus et al. 2002). Lakhani and Von Hippel (2003) discovered very similar 
data, demonstrating that only 2% of participants in the broader Apache discussion forum 
provided more than 50% of the answers to technical questions. Ghosh and Prakash 
(2000) showed that 10% of participants in a free software community account for 72% 
of the produced informatics code. Incidentally, the same inferences can be found in simi-
lar studies conducted on the Debian system (Krafft, 2005), the Linux development team 
(Webber, 2004), and open source environments at large (Duguid, 2006), all showing the 
system’s clear dependence upon the imbalance pattern of power-law distribution. Perhaps 
this imbalance is not entirely consistent with the ideology of open source movements, 
but is likely to depend on a meritocratic criterion, basically relying on the self-evident 
competence of the most skilled users. Contrarily, it is hard to explain the concentration 
process in other web environments, such as the blogosphere system to which the case of 
Grillo ultimately belongs.
Miconi 7
Even in the blog system, Mathieu O’Neil argues (2005: 4), we can easily find a sort 
of “A list”, a small group of hyper-connected sites favored by power-law. This tendency 
has been demonstrated by, among others, Clay Shirky (2003) through a survey of 433 
blogs: if we look at the in-links that regulate the relationship between those blogs, the 
first 12 sites collect 20% of links, and the first 50 – which are no more than 12% of the 
total amount – collect 50% of links. A similar tendency has been illustrated by Jason 
Kottke (2003) through a study of Technorati’s 100 most popular blogs, and by Cameron 
Marlow (2004), who analyzed a more significant dataset of 27,000 blogs. Farrell and 
Drezner, working on a sample of 4500 blogs dedicated to political issues, figured out that 
power-law organized them in a clearly non-democratic order (Farrell and Drezner, 2008: 
21), thus turning the blogosphere into a pyramid whose base is exceedingly distant from 
the apex. As a result, the most important blogs usually select the topics of discussion for 
all the others, which are then forced to link to the most influential ones (Farrell and 
Drezner, 2008: 22). Cameron Marlow (2006: 1–5) identified a similar statistical trend in 
the frequency with which authors update their sites, while Gruhl et al. (2004) showed 
that the number of posts produced a decrease in the same power-law distribution, reveal-
ing the gap between a vast majority of peripheral blogs and a very small number of suc-
cessful nodes.
Furthermore, this imbalance in blogs does not simply rely on technical reasons, but 
also reveals a vast difference in credibility between common bloggers and a few influen-
tial individuals: that is, the emergence of a charismatic authority (O’Neil, 2009: 116). 
The distribution of links within the blogosphere, namely the distinction between “blog-
roll” and “permalinks”, can provide a clear explanation. Unlike blogroll links, which 
express the endorsement of another blog, “permalinks” or “dynamic links” simply point 
to a specific topic likely to be included in any subpage. As shown in Marlow’s surveys, 
it is no accident that the distribution of the latter is more balanced than that of the former, 
arguably due to the fact that the links pointing to the home page of a blog are attracted by 
the charismatic authority of the most influential authors and therefore reveal a higher 
degree of concentration (Marlow, 2004: 6–8, 2006: 7). Content-driven discussions are 
more democratic, whereas the reduction of complexity requires the intervention of 
stronger personalities. Therefore, given that the blogosphere seems to follow a concen-
tration rule, is it surprising to witness the rise of a traditional leadership within?
Italian cascades
On the one hand, we have concentration processes likely to create technical premises for 
cultural concentration; on the other, we have to consider the condition of Italian cyber-
space and the cultural profile of its users. In this sense, what makes the Italian case typi-
cal is its vulnerability to what we could call “opinion cascades”. A cascade can in fact be 
intended as the sudden manifestation of the silent majority – or at least of a highly numer-
ous minority – normally acting at the deepest and hidden levels of public opinion.
According to Lohmann (1994: 50), a cascade is likely to take place when the informa-
tion about the nature of a political regime, usually “dispersed among the members of the 
society”, eventually becomes universally known. This process usually takes place 
through a sort of “signaling game” that involves a sender and a receiver, where the sender 
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provides “information pertinent to the receiver’s decisions”. The result is the transforma-
tion of the citizen’s private relationship with the system into a real public experience 
(Lohmann, 1994: 49). Grillo’s rhetoric of disclosure, and his call for popular direct 
action, seem to follow a similar vein.
Lustick and Miodownik (2004: 5) suggest that spatiality is a key factor in the spread 
of political cascades:
By spatiality we mean variation in the size of the zone of knowledge available to individuals, 
i.e. in the amount of access that individuals in a population have to information about a specific 
subset of that population rather than to parametric information about the population as a whole. 
The specification of the subset of the population with which an individual has more contact 
than with others can be a function of geography, that is, strictly speaking, spatial relations, but 
it can also be social.
A cascade can rise from a variation in the spatial configuration, being intended as both 
the material living space as well as the informational environment accessible by the peo-
ple. An extended survey actually found that the spread of information through the blogo-
sphere takes the shape of a cascade, with a few influential nodes following a power-law 
distribution (Gruhl et al., 2004; Leskovec et al., 2007). In all these cases, Duncan Watts 
argues (2003: 204), even networked people can stop thinking autonomously and eventu-
ally act as a “coherent mass”. With its fleeting success, Grillo’s blog both summarizes a 
broader technical tendency and exhibits a specific political circumstance: while back-
stage information about political affairs started to circulate through the blogosphere, a 
new space opened up and suddenly became ruled by the most influential player.
If we look back at recent Italian history, we can detect at least three different cascades: 
the first localized between 1992 and 1993 at the very end of the historical period known 
as the “First Republic”; the second spread between 1994 and 1998 at the beginning of the 
“Second Republic”, largely overlapping the popular consensus on Silvio Berlusconi; and 
the last beginning around 2009 when the effects of a global economic crisis started to 
affect Italian internal affairs and everyday life as well. Even though this recent opinion 
cascade does share some arguments proposed by Indignados and Occupy – such as the 
social responsibility of banks, critique of financial powers, rating agencies regulation, 
etc. – it also shows a continuity with respect to the previous national cascades and their 
hostility towards corruption, public bureaucracy and the privileges of politicians, as per-
ceived by the citizenship.
According to Cass Sunstein (2007: 84–85), cascades are a typical problem of the web. 
Insofar as people select some given environments and only connect to like-minded oth-
ers, as in Facebook, they renounce any “unexpected encounter”, so as to be exposed to 
information sources and opinions they have chosen in advance. Consequently, at least 
under given circumstances, dissent is no longer acceptable and a conformist cascade will 
be more likely to take place. However, in Italy, cyber-cascades actually complement the 
opinion cascades that have been circulating within different realms, from interpersonal 
communication to mass media. All these cascades have in fact been inspired, from 1992 
on, by the very same issue: the diffused hostility towards the “caste” of politicians, con-
sidered to be privileged, unjustly enriched and unpunished, and ultimately corrupt (Rizzo 
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and Stella, 2007). It is therefore no surprise that Beppe Grillo – who had been ostracized 
by the parties in 1986 – eventually provided an illusory personification of popular 
revenge.
All three cascades have generated a similar process: a huge bandwagon effect des-
tined to affect electoral results. The first gave strength to the movement against public 
funding to parties and proportional electoral law – both suddenly identified with the 
power of traditional parties as such – eventually abolished by referendum in 1993, in 
accordance with an unprecedented popular support (ranging from 82% to 90% and from 
28 to 31 million votes). In 1994, businessman and media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi took 
advantage of the second cascade, exploiting the widespread diffidence towards political 
professionals, through a last-minute campaign mainly based on the myth of the self-
made man: only a few months after the foundation of his party, he obtained more than 
eight million votes at the general election, and then, at the apex of his success, more than 
10 million votes at the European Parliament election. In this sense, Grillo’s success actu-
ally reproduces a cyclical phenomenon in the evolution of Italian public opinion, des-
tined to favor the non-institutional candidates (or rather, the candidates able to present 
themselves in such a way).
What all those movements have in common is a clear inclination towards populism: a 
concept that has a slightly positive meaning in a country affected by a deepening divide 
between a privileged “caste” of politicians and high-level functionaries and the rest of 
the population (Rizzo and Stella, 2007). While left-wing parties have always failed to 
embrace this rhetoric, so as to be eventually perceived as the very symbol of the estab-
lishment, populism has become a powerful electoral argument for both local and right-
wing movements, resulting in perfect suitability for both the one-way televised 
propaganda and social media-engaged practices (Lanni, 2011). As Paolo Flores D’Arcais 
(2011) famously pointed out, from 1993 onwards any party, in order to get consensus, 
might be able to “harness the wave of anti-politics” and occupy its strategic square: and 
what was true for Berlusconi in the late TV era, seems to be true for Grillo and the blog 
era as well.
As for the properties of contemporary digital cascade, an explanation can be found in 
the so-called “echo chamber” effect: blogs tend to produce a fragmentation and even a 
polarization of political opinion, simply preventing their readers from encountering 
alternative ideas. As a result, reality is fragmented into a variety of diverging interpreta-
tions. In the same way, the general audicence of TV is broken down into polarized com-
munities of beliefs, each reinforcing its “tribal” identity and radicalizing its ideology 
(Manjoo, 2008; Sunstein, 2007).
Because bloggers select their contents in advance and usually link to like-minded 
bloggers, the final result will be a “one-sided coverage of politics” (Baum and Groeling, 
2008: 359), to the point that readers will no longer deal with ideas and opinions they have 
not chosen in advance.
In any case, there is no scientific evidence about whether blogs produce, or simply 
reproduce, this polarization tendency: such an “insularity” seems not to increase across 
time, and thus arguably depends on the wider social tendency towards “homophily” 
rather than on the specific effect of the web (González-Bailón, 2013; Hargittai et al., 
2008). Surely, whichever it is, blogs contribute to shaping a very different reality with 
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respect to TV, which allowed the merging of public spheres and provided the audience 
with a shared representation of the world (Meyrowitz, 1985). On the contrary, a blogger 
can exercise an undisputed leadership over his or her selected audience: an authority that 
is also “a form of violence” and implies the “power of exclusion and stigmatization”, as 
well as the ability to decide “what is most interesting” (O’Neil, 2005: 8).
As for Grillo, from a merely sociological standpoint, it is not improper to analyze his 
role in the most traditional categories of power. Max Weber’s classical definition of 
“charismatic authority” actually gives a full understanding of our problem for at least 
three reasons. First, this kind of power ultimately relies on the spontaneous acknowledg-
ment by the “dominated”: its legitimacy does not require any ratification because it is 
simply unquestioned. Second, laws are not needed; or better yet, rules are directly 
embedded in the leader’s body and voice, so as to make any formal codification totally 
useless. Third, all intermediated agencies are no longer required, and all bureau powers 
are consequently weakened and absorbed by a kind of personal management of public 
affairs. Weber’s concept of power can therefore be extended to the blogosphere. How can 
we explain this oddity?
I have stated that Five Stars’ strategies are imposed by the leader: even admissions to 
the party are actually based on Grillo’s will, as are the rules regulating the duration of 
political activities, the economic treatment of parliamentarians, and so forth. Not acci-
dentally, Grillo recently started to challenge the principle established by the 67th article 
of the Italian Constitution, according to which congressmen are independent from any 
political mandate imposed by their party – a rule that could actually prevent the leader 
from directing the action of Five Star representatives, as he has basically been doing in 
the last year. In terms of communication, the structure of the blog can provide a clear 
exhibition of the same phenomenon: the role of followers is limited by definition, and 
Grillo himself manages the power to ban other individuals from the debate, as has often 
been reported. This transformation of power within digital environments is a difficult 
problem to stabilize. According to Manuel Castells’ (2009) general theory, contemporary 
forms of power can be organized into four categories: networking (“the power of the 
actors and organizations included in the networks” over the excluded groups); network 
(a form of power acting “by imposition” of rules and standards); networked (the author-
ity of some “social actors over other social actors” within the net); and network-making 
(the ability to program and “switch” different networks). The first and the last are to 
some extent the basic forms of authority exercised “by exclusion”, or through a very 
traditional form of control, while “network” and “networked” power act by inclusion. 
And this seems to be the case of Grillo with respect to Italian public opinion.
Even though Castells is well aware that power relationships do take place in net-
worked structures and that this configuration varies according to any specific network, 
this is probably the least convincing part of his work, as well as a major problem in cur-
rent media studies. The problem here is whether or not the sociology of media has to 
acknowledge the evidence of concentration as it clearly emerges from statistical findings 
of the physics of the web: namely, the extent to which inequality is to be considered as 
neither a borderline case nor an accidental aftermath, but rather as a structural condition 
in the political economy of the web. However, this assumption would in any case mean 
that democratic uses of the web are not allowed. If anything, it would suggest that they 
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are more difficult to realize and that they need to be studied with respect to their political 
inspirations rather than to favorable technical possibilities. Proof of the former could be 
the fact that many participative networks, as previously shown, finally reveal the follow-
ing of a hidden hierarchy; while the latter shows that the real democratic uses of the web 
are usually restricted to selected and well-motivated social circles (and often limited to 
brief experiences). In any case, technological and social networks are not one, nor do 
they follow the same rules. On the contrary, it is necessary to clearly differentiate between 
their properties so as not to provide a “one-dimensional” theory (Fuchs, 2009: 95–96; 
Van Dijk, 1999).
Therefore, in order to differentiate between these aspects, we have to admit that the 
technical rules of the web do not tell us anything about the groups acting in the network 
society. Power-law does not explain why a specific blog can attract so many followers. 
On the contrary, the morphology of the web possibly explains why such an undisputed 
authority can – and is likely to – take place despite the infinite voices available on the 
internet. It explains how and why a leadership ultimately emerges through horizontal 
relationships, but not precisely why Grillo took it on. In the end, that is a subject for 
social and political studies.
Discussion: Do digital artifacts have politics?
The more we dig into the depths of the network society, the more we discover a concen-
tration bias, leading us to a paradoxical conclusion and even more complicated ques-
tions. Is the concentration simply the technical rule of web development, or is it also 
affecting the level of users’ experience? And does this tendency have anything to do with 
such a concentration of authority, like Grillo within the Five Stars movement?
The extent to which technical configurations result in political consequences is a 
highly discussed topic, ranging from Karl Marx’s well-known distinction between the 
effects of hand and steam mills, to White’s analysis of the relationship between the dif-
fusion of the stirrup and social change in the Middle Ages; from Harold Innis’ and 
Marshall McLuhan’s technological determinism, to the discussion between Langdon 
Winner and Bernward Joerges of the politics of artifacts, and the overall contribution of 
the sociology of science. It could be said that if such a theoretical problem is too big to 
be resolved, it is probably because it is posed too generally.
My main point is not that such a relationship between technological and social con-
figurations is supposed to exist as a general rule, but rather that, in this case, a clear 
affinity does exist between the two. A systematic analysis would be required to show 
whether, and to what extent, this affinity depends upon the structure of the web as such 
or is more accidental. In other words – is Grillo’s political success a direct consequence 
of the diffusion of the web in Italy or, given the same premise, could things have gone 
differently?
To provide an answer, we have to look not only at the ecology of the web, but also at 
contemporary Italian history and at the conditions of society at large. If we consider the 
hypothesis that the web can be responsible for variable social effects in different coun-
tries, and that the “networked power” is likely to diversely affect different systems, we 
have to pay attention at least to the most evident aspects of Italian culture. Of first and 
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foremost importance is the national literacy rate. According to the last Report on the 
Social Situation in Italy by Censis (2012), non-readers account for approximately 50% 
of the population, possibly explaining the emergence of a traditional leadership through 
the strengthening of a cascade that started on the web and exploited the everyday offline 
word-of-mouth experience.
This new embedding of leaderships, pointed out by Mathieu O’Neil, could easily be 
linked to the overall personalization of politics brought about by broadcast media. 
However, the point I am most concerned with here is an interesting continuity between the 
opinion-giving processes shaped by vertical media and those taking place in horizontal 
media. And the case of Five Stars is far more interesting, in this sense, considering that its 
leader is the only Italian politician who has regularly been refusing to appear on TV and 
get interviewed by newspapers, while delegating its strategic communication to his blog 
and its ability to generate an information cascade. The personal nature of a leadership, in 
this sense, can be intended as a bridge between the blogosphere and society as a whole.
Even in situations of distributed content production and comment moderation… the structure 
of a weblog is intensely personal… because it is the logic of individual charisma that permeates 
any blog. […] Ultimately in weblogs, administrative power is happily autocratic. The expertise 
of the crowd does not translate into the corresponding capacity to act (O’Neil, 2009: 116).
If we look for continuity rather than discontinuity between traditional and contempo-
rary politics, we can be led to believe that something typical is acting in both Italian 
society and the Italian blogosphere, which deters the transition from the vertical to the 
horizontal paradigm (by which the whole theory of the network society is actually 
inspired). As for the state of society, Paul Ginsborg’s analysis of “familism” comes to 
mind, which focuses on its specific Italian version, grounded in cohesive family units, 
ruled by “vertical relationships” (Ginsborg, 1994: 68–69) and likely to inhibit any sort of 
“horizontal solidarity” (Ginsborg, 1998: 644). On the contrary, Ginsborg (1998: 640) 
argues, civil society – the missing link between family and state – does exactly require a 
form of peer solidarity, so as to transform individuals into citizens and shape a “horizon-
tal” culture able to prevent any strong leadership from rising up and degenerating 
(Ginsborg, 2004: 177).
Therefore, when it comes to the Italian blogosphere, we can question if a similar pro-
cess is taking place, by which a potentially horizontal system has finally turned vertical. 
According to Balmas et al. (2012), the personalization of politics can bring two almost 
opposite consequences: “decentralized” personalization or “centralized”. In the first 
case, power previously exercised through party committees splits into several autono-
mous individualities, as in “networked” contemporary movements (Castells, 2012), 
while in the second it becomes embedded in a central leader. In the Italian case, where 
the diffusion of the web has been associated with the long-term effects of familism rather 
than with the transition towards “networked individualism” (Rainie and Wellman, 2012), 
this second process is arguably taking place, and a vertical authority is strengthening 
even within the new digital platforms.
A closer took at the Italian blogosphere can possibly provide confirmation. Vincenzo 
Cosenza’s (2012) analysis of 1900 blogs actually shows a clear representation of the 
Miconi 13
system, in its turn ruled by power-law. The most interesting aspect shown by social net-
work analysis, is the distinction between “two different metrics”: the in-degree index, 
which measures the number of in-links, and the “betweenness centrality”, which 
expresses the ability of a node to shorten the distance between any two blogs – in other 
words, to act as a “bridge”. Even though the two indices often overlap, they ultimately 
belong to different properties: to the extent that a blog (such as Wittgenstein or Manteblog, 
in the Italian case) can be very central for its “in betweenness” index and have a rela-
tively low in-degree value, while others such as Grillo’s reveal the very opposite profile. 
The centrality of Grillo’s blog has not directly to do with networking attitudes (such as 
linking and bridging), but rather it relies on the unique ability to collect strategic in-links 
without in turn using hyperlinks in order to widen the discussion space. It is not by acci-
dent that the blog has no blogroll, but only gives space to a news aggregator owned by 
the same company that has built beppegrillo.it (while the blog does, despite Grillo’s 
rhetoric of transparency, host banners and third-party elements, even though the distribu-
tion of advertising revenues is far from clear).
A useful contribution to network theory is due to Jon Kleinberg and his distinction 
between two types of central nodes: the “hubs” and the so-called “authorities”. While the 
hubs play a fundamental bridging function, the authorities constitute the “authoritative 
sources” with respect to any given cluster of sites or any given subset of arguments. 
According to Kleinberg (1999: 611),
hubs and authorities exhibit what could be called a mutually reinforcing relationship: a good 
hub is a page that points to many good authorities; a good authority is a page that is pointed to 
by many good hubs.
In other words, the web is affected by two different forms of power, at least from a 
very technical standpoint: the hubs, due to the concentration of links and their likelihood 
to fill the distances between the edges, and the more centralized authorities, which are 
credited with the highest level of liability and trustfulness. We can suggest the hypothesis 
that, in the political economy of the web, some authorities – such as Grillo’s blog – do 
not emerge through the uneven statistical distribution of hyperlinks, but rather by obtain-
ing an amount of decisive in-links from some selected hubs, which regulate the traffic 
while at the same time channeling it towards specific edges. As far as we consider that 
the percentage of blog readers is usually not too high amongst the population, but it is 
high amongst bloggers and journalists, we can wonder if a two-step process has been 
active, by which the power-law first defined a technical hierarchy, and the hubs then 
selected beppegrillo.it as the most influential source. Such a two-level structure could 
also explain the spread of information cascades, originated by Grillo himself and propa-
gated through all the opinion leaders and the “satellites” ultimately depending on his 
blog. A process by which, in any case, cyberspace has moved from the original horizon-
tal structure to becoming a centralized one.
Finally, a few words must be dedicated to the political sense of this concentration 
tendency. Jodi Dean (2012: 19–32) is probably right when she suggests that critiques to 
centralization paradoxically take over the neoliberal ideology, according to which decen-
tralized is always better than centralized. Either way, my goal is not to uphold this idea, 
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but rather to show a particular way in which a contradictory political discourse is taking 
place – one that uses decentralization as a rhetorical way of building up a very traditional 
authority. What I would like to point out here is not that decentralization is better – which 
is not necessarily true – but that centralization of web resources, unlike different systems, 
is acting at a level deep enough to make users not necessarily aware of it. We are witness-
ing a kind of schizophrenic moment, in which many social groups are likely to use web 
platforms to mobilize against political institutions, while at the same time not question-
ing the ownership and governance of the platforms themselves (Grillo’s blog in Italy, as 
well as Facebook at a global level for example). And this is, in the final analysis, a seri-
ous matter of power.
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